The birth of aesthetics in the 18th century marks the passage from beauty to fine taste and the emergence of art as a separate sphere of culture. Indeed, before the Renaissance, art is not viewed separately from handcraft and the craftsman does not receive the distinctive status of a specialist of beautiful, an artist. This is due to two sets of reasons: first, the transformation of beauty, which becomes little by little a matter of taste and is subjective, and second, the emergence in the European culture of a special status for the artist, distinguishing him from the artisan. This slow evolution announced at the beginning of the Renaissance, will be completed only at the beginning of the 19th century.
to beauty, which is objective and perfect by default. The problem of the formation of the aesthetics as a separate science is in this passage of beauty itself, to personal taste, that promotes a new position, that of a lover of beauty, that of a critic, able to recognize the criteria behind his judgement, that of an artist, capable of reproducing the characteristics of an object by producing a work of art according to his requirements, and, finally, that of a philosopher, able to reflect on this new skill. Dealing with beauty, means to elucidate the manner in which beauty gives itself to a subject.
How do we recognize beauty? Aesthetics will be defined as art judging through the instance of good taste.
The meaning of taste
The taste is first defined as the sense of taste, opposed to touch, smell, hearing and sight. It is not this meaning that art uses: in order for taste to take a new direction -what we call today the faculty to discernit must first cease to be regarded as a mere sensation, in order to become a sixth sense: common sense. The taste is therefore no longer a physiological sense, but it involves education, social awareness -which indicates both politeness and an attribute which allows us to socially discriminate what is good taste or bad taste. We mark the difference between taste as sensation, and taste as a faculty of social appreciation, stretched between a pole of valuation and a pole of rejection, indicating the position of the education of good taste as an immediate ability to discern the delicate taste. In Kantian terms, we move from sensation (simple option to receive sensitive information) to feeling (reflexive ability to return to the sensation by including the axiological valuation of its approval or rejection). At a sensible level, one notes the emergence of critical judgment and the way that Kant offers a new critique of aesthetic judgment. But before defining the conditions, it's important to notice that transforming Beauty means linking it to a susceptible subjective terminal defined as a human person, who is ultimately processing the facts and situations which are submitted to him...
It is an appropriation of Beauty, which is no longer known by its objective properties, but by the effect it produces on a significant subjectivity of human nature. This dramatization of the aesthetics of beauty into aesthetic value, which applies to our senses, becomes a matter of appreciation: for most theorists, beauty is never just a matter of feeling, but also of imagination and reason, a delicacy of taste which involves discernment, refinement of expertise, aesthetic judgment as a rational product of culture.
Hence the reason why, starting from the 16th century in Italy and throughout Europe, the ability to judge of Beauty happens to be called taste, by metaphorical extension. It is more than flavour as substantial amount, as ability to identify and qualify. Flavour perception remains a sensation, which leads to the feeling of pleasant and unpleasant. Judgment of taste is different, even if it begins with a sensation, which is more likely to be visual or auditive rather than touch, taste or odour, as the latter three remain private. Thus, we can not share the feeling that is experienced and transformed by senses. The sphere of Fine Arts in the 16 th century borrows the distinction between art and technique from the Greek term corresponding to the former ars as manufacturing knowhow, set of rules, skill.
Aristotle speaks thus of poiesis: this term does not refer at all to poetry (the creative writing of metrical texts) but to the cultivation of a practical skill capable of material effect, of producing artefacts, firmly anchored in the sphere of quota, of industrial production. Poiesis is on the side of doing, of executing actions in an empirical and material causality which is controlled by its practical outcome. Although practising this skill in the exercise of a profession requires an apprenticeship, possibly knowledge, this exercise is governed by the effective empirical necessity (doing primes on knowledge). Thus, Aristotle defines poiesis in the Nicomachean Ethics VI, 2 and 4 as a production (poiesis) that differs from the action (praxis) and theoretical science (épisteme). Art, like production differs from science and morality. Just as action, Poiesis is practical, opposed to science that is theoretical. But unlike action, it has its end outside itself, in the object it produces. Aristotle defines it as a [Willingness to produce accompanied by exact rule ] and [always relates to a become ](VI, 4, 1140). So poiesis is a product which is accompanied by its know-how, as practical knowledge and objective codification rules. Art can then include a theoretical moment, though this moment represents merely a method, a manual.
However, from this point of view, there are no special privileges to be granted to craftsmen (production artists) engaged as other manufacturers in the practice of producing sensitive objects hic et nunc. Moreover, according to Plato but also to Aristotle, there is no special name to designate Fine arts, even if it occasionally appears as subject of their thinking. Renowned sculptor Phidias is considered a craftsman. If the Greeks do not have a specific word for "art" in the modern sense, they however give to the Muses a special place in their mythology: this flexible classification, collected by Hesiod, shows a trace of their interest in what we now call art. Hesiod reports that there are seven Muses, which represent a division of Fine Arts in ancient Greece, indicating what arts were preferred. Here's the list: Calliope -epic poetry, eloquence, Cliohistory, Erato -elegy, opera and choral, Euterpe -music (especially dance music), Melpomene -tragedy, Polyhymnia -pantomime, rhetoric, Terpsichoredance, Thalia -comedy, Urania -astronomy.
These mythological figures mix what from our point of view corresponds to scientific knowledge (history, astronomy) and to art (performing arts as pantomime, dance, music, poetry).
Actually, it shows that in the Greek conception, literature predominates, with epic, elegiac and especially with dramatic poetry, as well as theater, written in verse.
It culminates with comedy and with tragedy in particular, which Aristotle dedicated a book to (The Poetics). Music, dance and pantomime enter this complete show just as tragedy or comedy incorporate vocal and danced parts. It is worth mentioning that music and astronomy are both depicted as sciences of cosmic links. The absence of visual artsarchitecture, painting, sculpture -is also evident, as they were considered less noble, since they involved a material that had to be transformed.
Emancipation of the artist
This division of arts continues until the Renaissance, following the distinction between liberal arts and mechanical arts. The liberal arts include science and literature. They are considered noble since they bring to surface the competencies of free and educated men, liberated from the servile condition of the worker, the slave of the material. Liberal arts opposed mechanical arts, which include various handcrafts such as agriculture, physical exertion, war, but also painting.
Reaffirming the ancient order of knowledge, liberal arts give rise to a classification of sciences and practices theorized in the Middle Ages, as degrees of progressive education, instructional order of a learning science. First comes Trivium which comprises three disciplines of speech: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic (Cassiodorus, 6th century). Then comes Quadrivium which combines the four disciplines of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music.
Looking from a social dignity and intellectual merit perspective, liberal arts are viewed as the opposite of mechanical arts which include hunting or agriculture. Painters making use of powders, coloured material, pigments, spices and active chemicals, are obviously viewed as part of the mechanical arts, as architects or sculptors. These arts are therefore relegated within the sphere of mechanical arts, except for music and literature, which involve intellectual relationships, as their material is considered spiritual, combining the order of speech (Trivium) and the sequence of arithmetic and geometric relations in cosmos (Quadrivium).
Music was seen as mathematical and cosmological and it was defined in antiquity, since Pythagoras, as an arithmetical science, capable of providing a glimpse of the harmonious relations of the cosmos, hence its link with astronomy.
Literature is naturally placed in the within liberal arts, since it is the realm of logos, language and reason. Literature was including history, philosophy and theology alongside poetry and theatre with no clear separation of science and fiction. This is to be compared with the formation of a historical consciousness; the construction of an ideal Antiquity within the Renaissance is being made by the slow migration of arts (in the modern sense), moving away from the sphere of the mechanical arts to the sphere of the liberal arts. This was done via literature, as painters began to write about their art, thereby claiming for the painter the status of a humanist, skilled in the liberal arts.
Alberti, painter, sculptor and architect, wrote De pictura in 1435, in which he claims from the first pages the status of liberal art for painting, noting that the painter also must be a mathematician: indeed, Albert shows in his writings that the invention of perspective requires knowledge of mathematics. The painter equally needs mathematics to construct images in perspective, even if its applied mathematics he makes use of. This first text, which is laying the basis, is followed in the 16 th century by the monumental work of Vasari, also a painter-sculptorarchitect, who wrote a history of art in his time. Later, it's more the historians (rather than the practitioners) who document the history of art. Winckelmann, the German historian, writes in 1764 the first work on the art of Ancient Greece. We then move from writings by artists themselves to the creation of a new knowledge sphere, with art as its object. Art has thus achieved the rank of a decisive player in the cultural and aesthetic game, as a philosophical discipline, crowning its slow emergence.
Aesthetics -The long traject of a new science.
Baumgarten is the first author to introduce the term aesthetic and defines this new discipline as a science of beauty in his various works. The text of 1735 Meditationes philosophicae nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus marks the passage from the Aristotelian poetics (which sets the rules of tragedy) to aesthetics, as sensitive science (from aesthesis, which means sensation, in Greek). In his Metaphysics, in 1739, he devotes § 501-623 to define aesthetics as a new psychological branch of the metaphysical theory of the soul. Then in 1750 he published his Aesthetic, work that remains unfinished though: only the first part appears, called aesthetic theory, heuristic part that was supposed to be followed by a methodology, semiotics and an aesthetic practice. Here's how Baumgarten defines aesthetics:
Aesthetics (or theory of liberal arts, lower epistemology, art of the beauty of thinking, the art of the analogon of reason) is the science of sensory knowledge.
Thus, aesthetics is primarily the science of sensory knowledge, scientia cognitionis sensitivae. Baumgarten expands the realm of reason to sensitivity, to sensible perceiving of empirical knowledge. Aesthetics first includes the liberal arts (theoria liberalium artium) we defined earlier: art is now included in the culturally valued sphere of liberal arts. By dedicating an entire theory to liberal arts, aesthetics reveals the emancipation of Fine Arts at European level. It is worth noting though that the sense of art here is less as we know it today, leaning more towards art as poetry, as the perceiving of poetry and appreciation of it from an aesthetic point of view rather than creation of poetry. The privilege of poetry lies in the fact that it is deemed to be the least material of the arts, because its tools are language and thought, and it does not use stone like architecture or sculpture, colour like painting, or sound like music.
This promotion of poetry as knowledge is nevertheless a very important moment for the history of aesthetic ideas. Perceptual knowledge plays a role in the material sphere of the production of specific artefacts, which are objects of art. It is less a theory of the production of art, a poetic in the Aristotelian sense (treaty rules, instructions) than an epistemology of the sensitive system.
Baumgarten doesn't deliver a formula for framing the production or the acknowledgment of art, as only few sections are devoted to poetry which is evaluated as beautiful, but without trying to explain why it is pleasant to read, or how you can write beautiful poetry. Even if he presents an empirical sum of rules that govern the production and the evaluation of Beauty (the art of beautiful thinking, ars pulchre cogitandi), in reality aesthetics represents a logical figure within rational psychology, where the real obscure manifests itself as Beauty. The starting point of Baumgarten's writings is Leibnizian philosophy: Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding, 1703) wants to expand the field of logic to the probable and confused sensations. He also reaffirms Descartes' clear and distinct theory, but expands it from clear and distinct logic to the obscurity of sensation.
Baumgarten was encouraged by Leibniz to add the aesthetics of sensation to the only logic of thought. In his Treaty of Metaphysics, Leibniz affirms that knowledge can be clear or vague, distinct or confused, adequate (clear and distinct to the very basic of definitions) or inadequate (only symbolic, expressing itself with symbols, just as mathematics does, which correspond to operations rather than ideas), intuitive (clearly known) or unproven (doubtful, but still belonging to the domain of knowledge, such as game theory or the field of statistical probability).
Baumgarten reaffirms this theory, moving from the logic of the probable to the aesthetics of the vague idea: the analysis of knowledge adds to the logic of the clear idea the aesthetics of the vague ideas, in accordance with Leibniz's theory of a continuum between reason and sensibility, ideas and perception. This openness to the continuum that goes from clear logic to vagueness allows Baumgarten to create aesthetics and turn it into an authentic [science of sensible knowledge]. This new aesthetic and independent truth emerges next to logic truth, and reaches the domains of history, rhetoric, poetry and all other domains that can be an object of aesthetic truth as sensible knowledge.
Thus, the analogon rationi (and not rationality) becomes the place of origin for aesthetic truth and is reached only by phenomenal manifestation. Thus, for Baumgarten, perceptual knowledge has its own perfection. Cartesian terms of clarity and confusion aren't enough for him: he introduces the term sinnlich (sensible) and thus promotes the onset of sensibility in philosophy. Sensible knowledge must therefore be cultivated for its own sake, by the practice of art, of poetry.
Taste as faculty of critique -Kant
After the French critique of taste, the German concept of aesthetics as science of the sensitive and the English empirical idea of taste as sensation of Beauty, we are now embarking on an entirely new voyage, guided by Kant, where critique is no longer only that of taste, but becomes a transcendental critique of the power of knowledge.
In this way, Kant inaugurates a totally new definition for critique which coincides with that of philosophy itself: this transcendental critique is the examination of our faculties of knowledge, desire and judgment, and develops its analysis in a transcendental way, meaning that it deals with the conditions of possibility of our judgement of knowledge, of moral or aesthetics. Critique is necessarily transcendental for Kant. Critique (from krinein -separating, screening) corresponds in the first place to an analytical approach, of the Chemistry type, which breaks the whole in its constituent units. Kant adds a second determination, which he calls legal: critique means to examine the legal validity of the claims of reason.
However, according to Kant, human reason can not perceive intuitively the intelligible realities. Kant distinguishes the transcendent, an intuitive understanding of the essential using thought and the transcendental -concept he invented and defined as anything that exceeds the sensory experience and refers to the Absolute. The transcendental focuses on the structure of our spirit and seeks what are the conditions of possibility of our knowledge, our desires or our judgments. Thus, with Kant, we move from the ontology of Beauty to the epistemology of the judgment of good taste. But Kant also shows us why Beauty is necessarily transformed into taste, due to the fact that we cannot know Beauty in itself as intelligible essence or as an objective attribute of objects. The only thing we can know, he says, is made of the transcendental conditions of our experience, by inspecting the transcendental structures of our mind, which objectively determine the conditions of possibility of our experience.
Thus, philosophy cannot seek anymore to find the transcendent realities of ontology, but only to question its own power of knowledge by operating the transcendental analysis of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. The Critique of Pure Reason, which analyzes the claims of reason to achieve the Absolute, concludes that we can not know what is conditioned by the a priori structures of our sensory experience. Kant sets a new goal for philosophy to achieve, that of being critical by first questioning the power of reason before producing a doctrine. Critique, as transcendental critique becomes the condition of philosophy itself. Therefore the order of nature really amounts to the order of our representations, since we do not know the sensible or the intelligible reality as themselves, but only as it appears in our ability for knowledge. We do not know the essence, but only the phenomena, as sensory experience shaped by the transcendental subject.
But if Kant grants Hume and the empiricists the theory that any direct access to the essence is illusory, he is nevertheless not empiricist, since knowledge is based on a priori structures of our faculty of knowledge, not on a posteriori information, which is only empirical, and transmitted by senses. With the invention of transcendental, Kant stands above both empiricists and rationalists, for these transcendental structures (structuring our sensory experience) are not empirical. They cannot occur a posteriori (through a series of repeated empirical experiments, performed randomly and variably in a contingent manner), but a priori, because they occur earlier than the sensory experience, to which they provide the condition of possibility. The rationale is not reduced to analytic judgments (tautological, where subject and predicate are equivalent: S = P, of the type A = A, absolutely certain but which don't teach us anything, because the predicate is already contained in the subject). We can also make synthetic a priori judgments (of the type S is P, where the predicate adds something to our knowledge about the logical proposition, without using the tautological type A = B). Using the synthetic a priori judgments, knowledge is therefore reaffirmed in its area of necessity, but deals with a new definition of necessity, valid at all times, referring not on the objects themselves, but only on the objective structures of transcendental subjects (humans). This necessity is universally valid only for us as it concerns our mental structure; it is in this sense a subjective knowledge of ourselves. This transcendental subjectivity is objectively subjective: it is not variable from subject to subject, but concerns the objective structure of our subjectivity, which requires all subjects universally.
This entire philosophical device completely transforms the critique of taste. Firstly, we can not know Beauty. We can not know it either as essential transcendent (the Beautiful in itself), or as properties of the object. We do not know what is transcendent in itself, but only the transcendental structures of our experience. It certainly does not prevent us from thinking transcendent ideas using our reasoning (thinking of God, thinking about Beauty), but it doesn't represent knowledge. Thus, Kant stands against the rationalists, who believe that intellectual intuition of the essence of beauty is rationally possible. It retains Hume's empiricist lesson: our intuition is only sensitive, only the mind knows, but it knows a phenomenal world as it is perceived, that is to say, structured forms of a priori sensitivity, shaped by the logic categories of understanding.
However (and here he stands once more against empiricists) Kant poses a completely new question: of course, we do not know the Beauty in itself, but can we know the transcendental structures of our judgment of taste? This is a problem which Kant reconsiders various times throughout his writings. First, while reading British empiricists, he thought that taste is a matter of individual preferences and sensations and therefore it has no a priori structure. In this case, transcendental critique cannot be applied (analysis of our mental structures, subjectively objective).
On the other hand, we know that we can not know Beauty, so a rational science of what should be considered beautiful is impossible. But if taste could be the subject of a transcendental analysis and if we could show that the judgment of taste is a synthetic a priori judgment, then a critique of Beauty becomes possible. This is the step that Kant makes towards the end of his career, when he writes, in 1790, his masterpiece, the Critique of Judgment. So according to Kant, we can not know Beauty as a concept or as an attribute of the object. Consequently, love of Beauty is not just a matter of enjoyable sensations. Taste involves an a priori combination of our knowledge faculties, our understanding and our imagination, which produce pleasure (sensitive), but whose source is not in the sensation or in the object, only in the game of our a priori faculties, acting freely with the occasion of aesthetic judgment. There is therefore a transcendental structure of the faculty of judgment, which can be determined a priori and which represents the condition of our experience of Beauty. It is what Kant examines in the Critique of Judgment. For Kant, Beauty is no longer knowledge, or a transcendent value, nor a mere pleasurable sensation. Beauty is distinguished from truth, from good, but also from the pleasant; it is not a matter of knowledge or moral issue, nor a matter of pleasant sensation. This is a whole new approach to the problem.
Thereafter, the term aesthetics changes its meaning relative to Baumgarten's definition. For Baumgarten, aesthetics meant a critique of taste, a failed attempt to submit the critical judgment of Beauty to the rational principles that allow transforming of the judgment of taste in a true science of Beauty. This attempt has no other possible result according to Kant, who uses the term of Aesthetic in the beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason in an entirely different sense, not as science of the judgment of taste but as the science of sensation (feeling as aisthesis). Aesthetics then takes the direction of a science of the sensible in general, in order to isolate the structure of transcendental sensitivity, seeking its conditions of possibility. Yet, all our sensations appear within space and time. It is therefore a structure of a priori sensitivity: pure forms of intuition which shape the various aspects of empirical sensation and allow us to feel. The transcendental analysis of sensitivity ignores everything related to the empirical intuition, the material of the sensation, retaining only the simplest form of pure intuition, which shapes phenomena. As these two pure forms of sensible intuition, space and time, allow us to shape the empirical data of sensation, Kant believes that our sensory experience is phenomenal. We do not see things as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us through the a priori structures of our sensibility.
As already shown, according to Kant, we can reach knowledge only in the phenomenal order of sensitive knowledge, even if this knowledge is not empirical (uncertain) since it is based on a priori principles, which provide to mathematics and physics of Newton their apodictic certainty. Kant intends to provide philosophy with similar certainty by rejecting platonic intuition of essences: the mind thinks, but does not know. Only understanding, in conjunction with sensitivity can produce knowledge. Therefore, there is no knowledge of the Beauty.
Kantian philosophy thus reminds of the ancient theory of Beauty: there is no intelligible essence of Beauty, of which we could see the formal properties. When he wrote the first and second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant believed that it is impossible to produce an aesthetic taste, because we can not know Beauty in itself, so we aren't capable to produce a transcendental theory of an empirical taste. So in order for the Critique of taste to become possible, it was necessary for Kant to start consider the judgment of taste as also based on a priori principles, and not only on the empirical eventuality of individual tastes. Thus, in 1790 he wrote a third Critique. After the Critique of Pure Reason inspecting knowledge (understanding and sensitivity) and the Critique of Practical Reason on morality (right and faculty of desire), Kant starts a new Critique of Judgment, which examines the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful and sublime and the teleological judgment in nature.
In this third Critique, aesthetics concerns no longer the a priori forms of pure intuition as in the Critique of Pure Reason, but the ability to judge, the condition of applicability of the concept in the judgment. To this extent, the third Critique takes over from the two previous, and solves a problem that the Critique of Pure Reason had left out in its review of logic judgment (of knowledge). If the mind represents the power of rules, judgment is the power to subsume under the rules, to decide whether something is or is not the subject of a particular rule. But we never have any rules to enforce this rule. Already in the Critique of Pure Reason, in an important paragraph at the beginning of the transcendental judgment, Kant wrote:
[The judgment is a special gift that cannot be learned]. It is therefore not enough to be a scholar in order to judge: it still takes the power of good use of the rules (reinforcing a study of Descartes, who made the same observation in the beginning of the Discourse on the Method).
Therefore, judgment is not only a matter of knowledge and even the wisest are unable to determine whether a case is contained or not in concreto in the rule, because they lack of experience. Prudence under Aristotle, that is the art of judging, which does not come from knowledge but only from practice. Here we deal with the problem of the applicability of the rule: knowing the general rule does not tell us to what concrete case it is applied. Kant cites medicine, law and politics as domains where judgement is essential and doesn't depend on scholastic knowledge.
The problem of the faculty of judgment is to clarify the power of rules or common sense (Descartes), which Kant calls a natural gift, using the same terms as for depicting what he names a genius. Good judgment can not be learned. In other words, in addition to the studies in the Critique of Pure Reason, which considers the logical judgment in general, we need a new one, which examines the faculty of judgment. The general logic can't give precepts to judgment, and even the transcendental logic proposed by Kant can only ensure the correct judgment by specific rules.
In reality, what determines judgments can only come from demonstrative arguments, but it always involves reflection of the subject about its own state.
This theory of judgment is entirely new. Aristotle claims that the judgment is propositional, it is a predicative proposition: a predicate is assigned to a subject via a copula (S -P). It remains in the discursive thought, in the logical operation of the attribution of a predicate to a subject. For Kant, through a fundamental reversal, the judgment is not a proposal, but an act, an act of synthesis, which takes the technical name of subsumption: a variety is ordered by a rule that subsumes. The logical judgment is a crucial judgment: a rule is being applied to a case. But Kant invented a new type of subsumption, which proceeds backwards, from the particular case to the principle behind it. This is the new judgment that corresponds to the case of aesthetic judgment. The whole problem is the actual description of the judgment, because we do not possess a principle determining the empirical system under a given rule. How to judge in those cases where the rule is missing? Kant proposes a logical judgment determining a new type of judgment: the reflective judgment. The judgment is determining when the faculty of judging has a law -the transcendental universal principle on which we subsume the particular case. Judgement is reflective when we apply a case to a rule which is not given in advance, but only sought and incorporated afterwards, starting from the synthesis and then returning, on a reflective mode, to the operation of our judgment.
Conclusion -A perspective approach
Kant's position is representative because he reclaims the autonomy of Beauty by separating the domains of morality, knowledge and sensation and thus provides a starting point for contemporary philosophy. Even if for Kant himself Beauty deals more with nature than with art, it's his claims of autonomy of Beauty that swiftly move discussions towards art. Indeed, the question of aesthetics opens two new problems: that of philosophy of art in cultures (with the production of arts as its main theme, studying its diversity and history in order to make queries on a history of cultures, which is at the same time a phenomenology of the mind, eg Hegel) and that of philosophy of creation, who deals with art in terms of the actual process of production (and which is interested in the artist and his creation process, eg Nietzsche)
